

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04258 01 OF 03 201907Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----063642 201911Z /46
O 201843Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7418
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 04258

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF HEADS OF DELEGATION
MEETING, MARCH 17

CTB MESSAGE NO. 178

1. SUMMARY. DURING INFORMAL HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, MARCH 17, TO DISCUSS SOVDEL'S DRAFT OF A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, MOST OF THE MEETING FOCUSED ON PROBLEM OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS). WARNKE, SUPPORTED BY CRADOCK, EXPLAINED AT LENGTH WHY IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO PUT OFF ALL DETAILED AGREEMENT FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION BY A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC), AS WELL AS US REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE DATA FROM ISIS BE PROVIDED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS, AS OPPOSED TO IDEA THAT THE DATA MERELY BE AVAILABLE AS AN OCCASIONAL SUPPLEMENT WHEN REQUESTING PARTY ASKS FOR PARTICULAR DATA TO HELP IDENTIFY AN EVENT WHICH HAS BEEN DETECTED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. MOROKHOV SUGGESTED THERE COULD BE A
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04258 01 OF 03 201907Z

"GOLDEN MEAN" IN WHICH MORE TECHNICAL DETAIL WAS PROVIDED FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE JCC THAN IN SOVIET DRAFT, BUT LESS THAN THE EXCESSIVE DETAIL IN US ILLUSTRATIVE TEXTS. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT OF LAUNCHING OSIS, MOROKHOV EXPRESSED ENCOURAGEMENT REGARDING COMMENTS OF WARNKE ON PURPOSE OF OSI AND ON NATURE OF EVIDENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH A CRITIQUE BY WARNKE OF SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE II ON ISIS. HE SAID THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFY BOTH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH WERE NOT COVERED IN THE SOVIET TEXT, AND IT WOULD ALSO BE ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE EXPLICITLY FOR THE KEY VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES OF THE ADVANCED ISIS AND FOR TARGET DATES TO INSTALL THEM. PROVIDED THESE ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES WERE EXPLICITLY SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE SPECIFICATION OF TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, WE COULD AGREE ON AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE JCC IN WORKING OUT DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION. HOWEVER, SOVIET TEXT WAS BASICALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT MOST OF THE PROVISIONS MERELY TURNED THE PROBLEM ENTIRELY OVER TO THE JCC, CALLING ON THE JCC TO DO THE WORK WE SHOULD BE DOING. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THESE SOVIET PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD ONLY, IN FACT, BE "AGREEMENT TO AGREE" AT A LATER TIME. WARNKE REVIEWED OUR GENERAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE STATIONS; I.E., EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE REQUIREMENT FOR EXCHANGE OF ALL DATA FROM STATIONS ON A SMOOTHLY FUNCTIONING, ROUTINE BASIS. WARNKE POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET DRAFT ALSO OMITTED PROCEDURE FOR SITE SELECTION. HE SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS IN WHICH WE DID HAVE A COMMON VIEWPOINT; E.G., THE NATIONAL ISIS COULD ALSO BE DESIGNATED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DATA EXCHANGE; THERE COULD BE NATIONAL MANNING; AND THE PUR-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04258 01 OF 03 201907Z

POSE OF ISIS SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY FOR VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE.

3. CRADOCK AGREED BROADLY WITH WARNKE'S COMMENTS. HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET PAPER COULD BE THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATION IF IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMENTS IN RECENT US AND UK PLENARY STATEMENTS (MARCH 15). KEY ISSUE FOR UK DEL WAS RELATIONSHIP OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO THE JCC. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE ENOUGH DETAIL IN THE AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE SYSTEM CAPABILITY. ONE NEEDED TO KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISIS AND OSIS WOULD SUPPORT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT TO LEAVE DETAILS FOR THE JCC, BUT FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETERS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT NOW. UK DEL THOUGHT THE SOVIET ARTICLE I FAILED TO MEET THIS TEST. CRADOCK WONDERED IF ONE WAY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM MIGHT NOT BE TO HAVE A TECHNICAL ANNEX WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO HAVE RELATIVELY MORE GENERAL STANDARDS, WHILE THE ANNEX WOULD CONTAIN GREATER DETAIL.

4. DURING COURSE OF LENGTHY DISCUSSION WHICH ENSUED, MOROKHOV MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST:

A. SOVIET MOTIVATION WAS TO HAVE EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA FROM MOMENT OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TREATY OR AT LEAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THAT MEANT WE WOULD HAVE TO USE PRESENT DAY LEVEL OF EQUIPMENT AND MEANS OF TRANSMISSION. IT WOULD "HARDLY BE ACHIEVEABLE IN MY OPINION", TO SPECIFY FIRM SPECIFIC TARGET DATES FOR ADVANCED EQUIPMENT. BUT HE SAW NO DIFFICULTY IN WORKING OUT FUTURE DETAILS IN THE JCC.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04258 02 OF 03 201946Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----064023 201948Z /43

O 201843Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7419
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 04258

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

B. ON DATA TRANSMISSION, HE SAID THEY MIGHT HAND OVER 3-MONTH ACCUMULATIONS BUT THIS WAS NOT VERY PRACTICABLE. OR THEY COULD GIVE US DATA REQUESTED ON THE BASIS OF PARTICULAR EVENTS. BUT THEY SIMPLY DON'T HAVE A CAPABILITY WITH THEIR PRESENT STATIONS TO PROVIDE DATA CONTINUOUSLY. THIS PROBLEM COULD ALSO BE ENTRUSTED TO THE JCC. COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY WAS PARTICULARLY INADEQUATE IN REMOTE REGIONS WHERE THERE WERE LOW NOISE LEVELS. CAMELS OR DOG SLEDS WERE THE NORMAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. WHERE COMMUNICATIONS WERE BETTER, THAT IS, NEAR CITIES, THERE WOULD BE MUCH HIGHER NOISE LEVELS. THE AGREEMENT COULD CONCEIVABLY PROVIDE FOR THE DISTANT FUTURE BUT THAT WOULD REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK AND EXPENSE.

C. ON TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, SOVS COULD CONCEIVABLY AGREE TO A GENERAL LIST OF SOME TECHNICAL PARAMETERS.

BUT THERE WOULD BE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING TO THE SPECIFIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS THE US DEL HAD PROPOSED. THESE WERE TOO DEMANDING AND TOO ADVANCED. SUCH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04258 02 OF 03 201946Z

ISIS WOULD BE ABLE TO REPORT ALL ACTIVITIES WITHIN HUNDREDS OF KILOMETERS OF THESE STATIONS, NOT MERELY TENS OF KILOMETERS AS US HAD SAID IN ITS RECENT SPEECH, AND THEREFORE THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO RECORD EVERYTHING, INCLUDING THINGS NOT RELATED TO EXPLOSIONS.

D. ON AUTHENTICATION, MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE DEVICE THE US PROPOSES DOES NOT NOW EXIST. AND IT WOULD NOW BE IMPOSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE US DEVICE AT MOST SOVIET STATIONS. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO "RELY ON YOUR DEVICE". IDEA OF AN AGREED DEVICE WAS PREFERABLE. MOROKHOV COULD SUGGEST THAT TAPES BE SEALED, "USING YOUR SEAL", AND THEN DELIVERED TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES. (FAKLEY (UK) LATER MADE COMMENT THAT SEALING OF TAPES WOULD NOT SOLVE PROBLEM; BUT, IF TAPES WERE UTILIZED, THEY SHOULD HAVE AUTHENTICATION INFORMATION INCLUDED WITHIN THEM.)

E. MOROKHOV SAID HE LIKED CRADOCK'S IDEA OF A TECHNICAL ANNEX. HE CONCLUDED HIS DISCUSSION STRESSING FRANK NATURE OF HIS COMMENTS AND ASKING THAT HE NOT BE QUOTED, OR "I WILL RECEIVE A BEATING FROM MY SPECIALISTS".

5. WARNKE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WHICH HAD TO BE RESOLVED BECAUSE IT INVOLVED FOR US A PRE-CONDITION TO HAVING ANY TREATY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS BASICALLY SAYING THAT ISIS WERE NOT VERY IMPORTANT, OR HOW THEY RECORDED DATA, OR TRANSMITTED THE DATA. THEY WERE SAYING THAT WE WOULD SIMPLY GET SOME DATA FROM EXISTING STATIONS AND THEN NEGOTIATE LATER FOR BETTER STATIONS. BUT THIS WAS NOT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION. WE HAVE IN MIND AGREEMENT FOR CONTINUOUS DATA, WITH NEAR REAL TIME TRANSMISSION, FROM STATIONS WITH AGREED CHARACTERISTICS AND AT AGREED SITES. THIS HAS TO BE WORKED OUT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04258 02 OF 03 201946Z

BY US IN THIS NEGOTIATION BECAUSE IT IS A PRE-CONDITION TO HAVING A TREATY. SOME GOOD EQUIPMENT WAS, IN FACT, ALREADY AVAILABLE AND INSTALLED IN SOME COUNTRIES; I.E., THE SROS. THE SOVIETS COULD LOOK AT THIS EQUIPMENT AND STUDY IT. AND THERE WAS NO REASON WHY WE COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE FUTURE EQUIPMENT.

THIS WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US. WARNKE ALSO THOUGHT THE IDEA OF A TECHNICAL ANNEX AS SUGGESTED BY CRADOCK MIGHT BE HELPFUL. BUT THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A BASIC DIFFERENCE OF VIEW. IF MOROKHOV DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO WORK ON THE BASIS WE WERE PROPOSING, HE WOULD HAVE TO GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS--BECAUSE THERE WAS SIMPLY NO POSSIBILITY, GIVEN BASIC US POSITION ON ISIS, THAT WARNKE COULD GET FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT INSTRUCTIONS. THIS WAS NOT MEANT AS A CHALLENGE OR ULTIMATUM. WE JUST HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAD A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF VIEW.

6. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT HE HAD GIVEN US THE SOVIET DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT AS A TACTICAL MOVE "TO SEE IF ANY KNOTS CAN BE LOOSENEED". SOVS HAVE "VERY LOW NECESSITY FOR ISIS AND THIS WILL CONTINUE". US DEL SHOULD PROVIDE ITS FORM OF ARTICLE I TO THE SOVS AND "WE WILL CONSIDER IT WITHOUT PREJUDICE". BUT US SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT HAS BEEN ASKING FOR WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TODAY.

7. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE II ON INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. WARNKE SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT USE LANGUAGE SUCH AS THE TERM "SEISMIC EVENT" WHICH CREATES UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED OR SHOULD BE PERMITTED. ON PURPOSE OF OSIS, WARNKE SAID THERE SHOULD BE A STRAIGHTFORWARD STATEMENT THAT THE PURPOSE SHOULD BE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04258 03 OF 03 201944Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----064011 201947Z /43

O 201843Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7420
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 04258

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE EVENT IN QUESTION WAS AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. ON NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE, HE SAID WE SHOULD FIND A FORMULATION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY PARTICULAR TYPE OF EVIDENCE. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS, IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING UNSUBSTANTIATED REQUESTS, TO LIMIT THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO SEISMIC EVIDENCE OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL PHENOMENA THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT THESE COMMENTS GAVE HIM ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THERE COULD BE A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT AN AGREED TEXT. WARNKE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA04258
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780123-0014
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780348/aaaabooy.tel
Line Count: 291
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a951f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3271727
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, MARCH 17 CTB MESSAGE NO. 178
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a951f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014